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Digest: People v. Gay
Ryan Odenwalder

Opinion by Baxter, J., with Kennard, Acting C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin,
J., Moreno, J., Corrigan, J., and Marchiano, J. Concurring Opinion by
Werdegar, J., with Kennard, Acting C. J., and Marchiano, J.
Issue
Can a defendant present evidence at a penalty retrial about the
circumstances of the offense that is inconsistent with the verdict reached in
the guilt phase of the trial pursuant to California Penal Code section 190.3?
Facts
Kenneth Gay (Gay) and Raynard Cummings (Cummings) were
charged with the murder of a police officer, Paul Verna (Officer Verna),
during a traffic stop. 1 The prosecution suggested that their motive was to
avoid prosecution for four "brutal" robberies they had recently committed. 2
During these robberies, their wives, Pamela Cummings (Pamela) and Robin
Gay (Robin), accompanied them, with Pamela as driver. 3 Gay, who was of
mixed race, would sit in the front passenger seat, and Raynard, who was
black, would sit in the back. 4
Less than two weeks after the latest robbery, Officer Verna pulled
over the car containing Cummings and Gay and their wives. 5 The car had
been stolen and its license plates switched. 6 Pamela exited the car and was
unable to produce registration. 7 As Officer Verna approached the car to
talk to the men inside, Cummings shot the Officer in the shoulder. 8 In
total, Officer Verna was shot with six bullets from the same gun. 9
Testimony from various eyewitnesses conflicted over whether Gay or
Cummings fired the additional shots. 10

People v. Gay, 178 P.3d 422, 424 (Cal. 2008).
!d. at 424-25.
3 !d. at 425.
4 !d.
s !d. at 426.
6 !d.
7 !d.
8 !d.
9 !d. at 430.
10 !d. at 427--29.
1

2

203

Chapman Law Review

204

[Vol. 11 :203

Several hours later, the four met to discuss the shooting. 11 The wives'
testimony conflicted as to whether Gay claimed credit for the shooting. 12
On her way home, Pamela stopped and anonymously called the police to
report that a man resembling Cummings shot Officer Vema. 13 The next
day, undercover police officers followed Robin and Pamela to Oceanside,
where they met up with their husbands. 14 The police intercepted their car
and arrested them, finding Cummings and Gay hidden in the back seat. 15
After her arrest, Pamela admitted that she had lied to the police and
agreed to cooperate in exchange for a reduction of the charges against
her. 16 Gay and Cummings were tried together. 17 Pamela testified that, after
Cummings fired the initial shot, Gay shot Vema in the back and then fired
two additional shots standing over Vema. 18 While some eyewitnesses
corroborated these facts, others identified Cummings as the shooter. 19
After evidence in aggravation was presented, a jury convicted both
men of murder and sentenced them to death. 20 Gay filed a writ of habeas
corpus claiming ineffective counsel for the penalty phase of the trial. 21 The
California Supreme Court agreed and remanded for a new penalty trial. 22
At the retrial, the trial court excluded four statements Cummings had
made bragging that he had fired all six shots at Vema. 23 The court also
excluded testimony of an eyewitness identification expert to explain the
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimony and testimony of
witnesses that would show that someone else was the shooter. 24 The trial
court also instructed the jury to disregard the defense's opening statement,
saying that defendant's guilt was conclusively proven and that there would
be no evidence presented to the contrary. 25 The court denied the defense's
motions for a mistriat.2 6
After the retrial, the jury affirmed the verdict of death, and Gay
appealed. 27 The Supreme Court of California granted review. 28
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Analysis
Gay argued that the evidence suggesting he was not the shooter was
admissible as relevant under several subdivisions of Section 190.3 of the
California Penal Code. 29 The Court stated that its decision in People v.
Terry recognized that a defendant may provide evidence in a penalty retrial
of his version of the circumstances surrounding the crime to support a
defense of lingering doubt. 30 The Terry court explained that, if a different
jury decides the guilt and penalty phases, it should hear the defendant's
version of the facts and decide whether it has any lingering doubt as to the
defendant's guilt. 31 The In re Gay Court also found that other states
allowed the presentation of evidence of the circumstances of the offense to
support a lingering doubt defense in the penalty phase. 32
The Court stated that error in excluding evidence presented at the
penalty phase is reversible if there is a "reasonable possibility" that the
exclusion of the evidence affected the verdict. 33 The Court observed that
the identity of the shooter was central to Gay's defense. 34 The Court also
noted that only four of the defendant's witnesses were permitted to testify,
and only one of them actually saw the shooting. 35 The four witnesses who
saw the shooting and would have supported the defense's theory of
lingering doubt were not permitted to testify. 36 The Court also noted that,
although Gay was permitted to show that Pamela attempted to shift blame
for the murder to Cummings, Gay was prevented from showing that
Cummings himself claimed that he was the shooter. 37
The Court found that the trial court's instructions to the jury and
exclusion of evidence were prejudicial. 38 The Court reasoned that, while
the trial court instructed the jury at the close of the evidence on lingering
doubt, the court did not withdraw its earlier, inconsistent instruction. 39 The
Court stated that the jury was left confused as to whether it should consider
the earlier instruction in determining lingering doubt. 40 Thus, the Court
29 ld. at 436-37 (citing CAL. PEN. CoDE§§ 190.3, 190.3(a), 190.3(j), 190.3(k)). This Section
provides that, if a defendant has been found guilty of first-degree murder, the trier of fact, in the penalty
phase, may consider "any matter relevant to ... mitigation and sentence," such as "the nature and
circumstances of the present offense," CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.3, "[t]he circumstances of the crime of
which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding," § 190.3(a), "[w]hether or not the
defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was
relatively minor," § 190.3(j), or"[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime,"§ 190.3(k).
30 Jd. at 437 (citing People v. Terry, 390 P.2d 381 (Cal. 1964)).
31 Jd. (citing People v. Terry, 390 P.2d 381 (Cal. 1964)).
32 !d. at 439-40 (citing In re Gay, P.2d 476 (Cal. 1998)).
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stated, it was impossible to know which of the instructions the jury applied
in reaching its verdict. 41
The Court concluded that, despite the aggravating evidence presented,
there was a reasonable possibility that the jury could have selected the
lesser penalty by finding lingering doubt. 42 The Court reasoned that the
evidence indicating that defendant was not the shooter would have been
important in determining what penalty to impose. 43
Holding
The Court held that the trial court's exclusion of evidence that
defendant was not the shooter during the penalty phase, in support of a
defense of lingering doubt, was reversible error. 44 Thus, the Court reversed
the judgment of death and ordered a third sentencing trial. 45
Concurrence
Justice Werdegar clarified that the majority's holding reversed in part
the previous ruling in In re Gay, in which the Court held that lingering
doubt evidence is not relevant to the circumstances of the crime. 46 He
noted that the majority simply ignored the inconsistent holding in In re Gay
because the previous decision involved a unitary trial, whereas, in the
present case, the sentencing trial was separate. 47
Legal Significance
This decision reaffirms the long-standing rule that a defendant can use
lingering doubt as a mitigating factor to introduce evidence that he was
innocent of the crime. The ruling essentially overrules the earlier ruling in
In re Gay, in which the Court implied that a defendant's introduction of
evidence of innocence was a retrial of guilt.
In practice, the decision will not affect cases where the same jury
returns both a guilt and sentence verdict. In those cases, the evidence used
for the guilt phase will not be introduced for the sentencing phase because
it is already before the jury. But this holding does provide more guidance
to trial courts when the sentencing phase is separated from the guilt phase
of a trial. While a defendant will not be able to question the conviction at
sentencing, he can provide evidence inconsistent with the conviction to
persuade the jury that there is still lingering doubt as to his guilt.
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